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Abstract
The root of my argument is that any AI threat comes, not from machines that are too
smart, but from machines that are too dumb. Such dumb machines pose a threat to individual
humans, but not to humanity. Worrying about machines that are too smart distracts us from
the real and present threat from machines that are too dumb.
Concerns have recently been widely expressed that Artificial Intelligence presents a threat to
humanity. For instance, Stephen Hawking is quoted in [Cellan-Jones, 2014] as saying:
“The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.”
Similar concerns have also been expressed by Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak and others.
Such concerns have a long history. John von Neumann is quoted by Stanislaw Ulam [Ulam, 1958]
as the first to use the term the singularity1 , i.e., the point at which artificial intelligence exceeds
human intelligence. Ray Kurzweil has predicted that the singularity will occur around 2045
[Kurzweil, 2005] — a prediction based on Moore’s Law as the time when machine speed and
memory capacity will rival human capacity. I.J. Good has predicted that such super-intelligent
machines will then build even more intelligent machines in an accelerating ‘intelligence explosion’
[Good, 1965]. The fear is that these super-intelligent machines will pose an existential threat to
humanity, e.g., keep humans as pets or kill us all [Warwick, 2004] — or maybe humanity will just
be a victim of evolution.
I think the concept of the singularity is ill-conceived. It is based on an oversimplified and false
understanding of intelligence. Moore’s Law will not inevitably lead to such a singularity. Progress
in AI depends not just on speed and memory size, but also on developing new algorithms and the
new concepts that underpin them. More crucially, the singularity is predicated on a linear model
of intelligence, rather like IQ, on which each animal species has its place, and along which AI is
gradually advancing. Intelligence is not like this. As Aaron Sloman, for instance, has successfully
argued, intelligence must be modelled using a multi-dimensional space, with many different kinds
of intelligence and with AI progressing in many different directions [Sloman, 1995].
AI systems occupy points in this multi-dimensional space that are unlike any animal species. In
particular, their expertise tends to be very high in very narrow areas, but non-existent elsewhere.
Consider, for instance, some of the most successful AI systems of the last few decades.
Deep Blue: was a chess-playing computer, developed by IBM, that defeated the then world
champion, Garry Kasparov, in 1996. Deep Blue could play chess better than any human,
but could not do anything other than play chess — it couldn’t even move the pieces on a
physical board.
Tartan Racing’s Boss: was a self-driving car, built by Carnegie Mellon University and General
Motors, which won the DARPA Urban Challenge in 2007. It was the first to show that self-
driving cars could operate safely alongside humans, and so stimulated the current commercial
interest in this technology. Tartan Racing couldn’t play chess or do anything other than drive
a car.
∗Thanks to Stephan Schulz, Lucas Dixon, the St Andrews University Student Debating Society and two anony-
mous CACM reviewers for feedback on earlier versions.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity (accessed 31st December 2015)
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Watson: also developed by IBM, was a question answering system that in 2011 beat the World
champions at the Jeopardy general-knowledge quiz game. It can’t play chess or drive a car.
IBM are developing versions of Watson for a wide range of other domains, e.g., in healthcare,
the pharmaceutical industry, publishing, biotechnology and a chatterbox for toys. Each of
these applications will be similarly narrowly focused.
AlphaGo: was a Go-playing program, developed by Google’s DeepMind, that beat the World
champion, Lee Sedol, 4-1 in March 2016. AlphaGo was trained to play Go using deep
learning. Like Deep Blue, it required a human to move the pieces on the physical board
and couldn’t do anything other than play Go, although DeepMind used similar techniques
to build other board-game playing programs.
Is this situation likely to change in the foreseeable future? There is currently a revival of
interest in Artificial General Intelligence, the attempt to build a machine that could successfully
perform any intellectual task that a human being can. Is there any reason to believe that progress
now will be faster than it has been since John McCarthy advocated it 60 years ago at the 1956
inaugural AI conference at Dartmouth? It’s generally agreed that one of key enabling technologies
will be commonsense reasoning. A recent CACM Review article [Davis & Marcus, 2015] argues
that, while significant progress has been made in several areas of reasoning: temporal, geometric,
multi-agent, etc., many intractable problems remain. Note also that, while successful systems,
such as Watson and AlphaGo, have been applied to new areas, each of these applications is still
narrow in scope. One could use a ‘Big Switch’ approach, to direct each task to the appropriate
narrowly-scoped system, but this approach is generally regard as inadequate in not providing the
integration of multiple cognitive processes routinely employed by humans.
I am not trying to argue that Artifical General Intelligence is, in principle, impossible. I
don’t believe that there is anything in human cognition that is beyond scientific understanding.
With such an understanding will surely come the ability to emulate it artificially. But I’m not
holding my breath. I’ve lived through too many AI hype cycles to expect the latest one to deliver
something that previous cycles have failed to deliver. And I don’t believe that now is the time
to worry about a threat to humanity from smart machines, when there is a much more pressing
problem to worry about.
That problem is that many humans tend to ascribe too much intelligence to narrowly focused
AI systems. Any machine that can beat all humans at Go must surely be very intelligent, so by
analogy with other world-class Go players, it must be pretty smart in other ways too, mustn’t it?
No! Such misconceptions lead to false expectations that such AI systems will work correctly in
areas outside their narrow expertise. This can cause problems, e.g., a medical diagnosis system
might recommend the wrong treatment when faced with a disease beyond its diagnostic ability, a
self-driving car has already crashed when confronted by an unanticipated situation. Such erroneous
behaviour by dumb machines certainly presents a threat to individual humans, but not to humanity.
To counter it, AI systems need an internal model of their scope and limitations, so that they can
recognise when they are straying outside their comfort zone and warn their human users that
they need human assistance or just should not be used in such a situation. We must assign a
duty to AI system designers to ensure that their creations inform users of their limitations, and
specifically warn users when they are asked to operate out of their scope. AI systems must have
the ability to explain their reasoning in a way that users can understand and assent to. Because
of their open-ended behaviour, AI systems are also inherently hard to verify. We must develop
software engineering techniques to address this. Since AI systems are increasingly self improving,
we must ensure that these explanations, warnings and verifications keep pace with each AI system’s
evolving capabilities.
The concerns of Hawking and others were addressed in an earlier CACM Viewpoint
[Dietterich & Horvitz, 2015]. While downplaying these concerns, Dietterich & Horvitz also cate-
gorise the kinds of threats that AI technology does pose. This apparent paradox can be resolved
by observing that the various threats that they identify are caused by AI technology being too
dumb, not too smart.
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AI systems are, of course, by no means unique in having bugs or limited expertise. Any
computer system deployed in a safety or security critical situation potentially poses a threat to
health, privacy, finance, etc. That is why our field is so concerned about program correctness and
the adoption of best software engineering practice. What is different about AI systems is that
many people have unrealistic expectations about the scope of their expertise, simply because they
exhibit intelligence — albeit in a narrow domain.
The current focus on the very remote threat of super-human intelligence is obscuring this very
real threat from sub-human intelligence.
But could such dumb machines be sufficiently dangerous to pose a threat to humanity? Yes, if,
for instance, we were stupid enough to allow a dumb machine the autonomy to unleash weapons of
mass destruction. We came close to such stupidity with Ronald Reagan and Edward Teller’s 1983
proposal of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, aka ‘Star Wars’)2. Satellite-based sensors would
detect a Soviet ballistic missile launch and super-powered x-ray lasers would zap these missiles
from space before they got into orbit. Since this would need to be accomplished within seconds, no
human could be in the loop. I was among many computer scientists who successfully argued that
the most likely outcome was a false positive that would trigger the nuclear war it was designed to
prevent. There were precedents from missile early-warning systems that had been triggered by,
among other things, a moon-rise and a flock of geese. Fortunately, in these systems a human was
in the loop to abort any unwarranted retaliation to the falsely suspected attack. A group of us
from Edinburgh met UK Ministry of Defence scientists, engaged with SDI, who admitted that that
they shared our analysis. The SDI was subsequently quietly dropped by morphing it into a saner
programme. This is an excellent example of non-computer scientists over-estimating the abilities
of dumb machines. One can only hope that, like the UK’s MOD scientists, the developers of such
weapon systems have learnt the institutional lesson from this fiasco. We all also need to publicise
these lessons to ensure they are widely understood. Similar problems arise in other areas too, e.g.,
the 2010 flash crash demonstrated how vulnerable society was to the collapse of a financial system
run by secret, competing and super-fast autonomous agents.
Another potential existential threat is that AI systems may automate most forms of human em-
ployment [Richard Susskind, 2015, Vardi, 2015]. If my analysis is correct then, for the foreseeable
future, this automation will develop as a coalition of systems, each of which will automate only a
narrowly defined task. It will be necessary for these systems to work collaboratively. Humans will
be required to: orchestrate the coalition; recognise when a system is out of its depth; and deal with
these ‘edge cases’ interactively. The productivity of human workers will be, thereby, dramatically
increased and the cost of the service provided by this multi-agent approach will be dramatically
reduced, perhaps leading to an increase in the services provided. Whether this will provide both
job satisfaction and a living income to all humans can currently only be an open question. It is
up to us to invent the future in which it will do, and to ensure that this future is maintained as
the capability and scope of AI systems increases. I don’t underestimate the difficulty of achieving
this. The challenges are more political and social than technical, so this is a job for the whole of
society.
As AI progresses, we will see even more applications that are super-intelligent in a narrow
area and incredibly dumb everywhere else. The areas of successful application will get gradually
wider and the areas of dumbness narrower, but not disappear. I believe this will remain true even
when we do have a deep understanding of human cognition. Maggie Boden has a nice analogy
with flight. We do now understand how birds fly. In principle, we could build ever more accurate
simulations of a bird, but (a) this would incur an increasingly exorbitant cost and (b) we already
achieve satisfactory human flight by alternative means: aeroplanes, helicopters, paragliders, etc.
Similarly, we will develop a zoo of highly-diverse, AI machines, each with a level of intelligence
appropriate to its task — not a new uniform race of general-purpose, super-intelligent, humanity
supplanters.
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Defense_Initiative (accessed 31st December 2015).
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